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THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF MANDATORY STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION REFERENDUMS:
LESSONS FROM THE 2000S REGARDING
OBSTACLES AND PATHWAYS TO
THEIR PASSAGE
John Dinan*
Among the numerous ways that state constitutions differ from the U.S.
Constitution is in providing a broader array of constitutional amendment
and revision mechanisms. Article V of the U.S. Constitution establishes
only two means of changing the document. Amendments can be proposed
by two-thirds of both houses of Congress and then ratified by three-fourths
of the states, either in state legislatures or state conventions. Conventions
can be called by Congress upon petition of two-thirds of the state legisla-
tures.' But when we examine state constitutions-and there is significant
variation among the states2-we find that in addition to permitting legisla-
tive-initiated amendments and conventions, as all 50 states do, 3 one state
establishes periodic revision commissions that can submit amendments di-
rectly to the people,4 18 states permit amendments to be initiated by the
people,5 and 14 states provide for mandatory referendums that permit the
people to vote at regular intervals on whether to call a convention.6
I focus in this article on the mandatory convention referendum device,
which is of interest because it currently offers perhaps the most viable ave-
nue for undertaking a comprehensive reexamination of a state constitution
rather than relying solely on piecemeal amendments that can have the cu-
mulative effect of producing inconsistent and unworkable outcomes. Al-
though some state constitutional changes are best pursued in piecemeal
* William E. Simon Visiting Fellow, James Madison Program, Princeton University; Associate
Professor, Department of Political Science, Wake Forest University. I have benefited from Gerald Ben-
jamin's comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. U.S. Const. art. V.
2. For details on these variations, see G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting from
Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36
Rutgers L.J. 1075 (2005); Gerald Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in State Constitu-
tions for the Twenty-First Century: The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform vol. 3, 177 (G. Alan Tarr
& Robert F. Williams eds., State U. of N.Y. Press 2006) [hereinafter Benjamin, The Agenda of State
Constitutional Reform].
3. Tarr & Williams, supra n. 2, at 1092. Forty-one states make explicit provision in their constitu-
tions for the calling of conventions; in the remaining states it has been understood that it is possible for
conventions to be called. Id. at 1078-1079.
4. Id. at 1097-1098.
5. Id. at I 100.
6. Id. at 1079.
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fashion through legislatively initiated or popularly initiated amendments,
the effect of proceeding entirely through piecemeal changes can over time
be problematic. Proceeding solely in a piecemeal fashion does not permit a
comprehensive review of the full range of existing constitutional provisions
that a convention can provide. Such a comprehensive review can be partic-
ularly useful when existing provisions, often added at different periods,
tend to work at cross purposes or unduly limit the discretion of state offi-
cials, as when amendments mandate regular increases in state spending on
certain programs but limit legislators' ability to fund these increases.7
For many years, constitutional conventions were called regularly; how-
ever, in recent years they have become increasingly rare.8 In the 195-year
period from 1776 to 1970, the 50 states held 220 conventions, and most
were called by legislatures, which are generally, but not always, required to
obtain approval from the people beforehand; but the 40-year period from
1971 to 2010 has produced only 13 conventions (and none after 1992).9
This drop-off is attributable to several factors but is due in no small part to
legislators' reluctance to submit convention questions to the public and
thereby cede control over the revision process.10
Indeed, of the 13 conventions held since 1971, six were comprised of
legislators sitting as delegates and/or were limited in the topics they could
address (Tennessee in 1971 and 1977, Rhode Island in 1973, Louisiana in
1973-1974 and 1992, and Texas in 1974),11 leaving only three unlimited
conventions that featured elected delegates and were called by legislatures
(Montana in 1971-1972, North Dakota in 1971-1972, and Arkansas in
1978-1980),12 and another four called via mandatory convention referen-
dums (New Hampshire in 1974 and 1984, Hawaii in 1978, and Rhode Is-
7. For a recent argument along these lines, see Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Consti-
tutions: Reflections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1517, 1542-1543 (2009).
8. Tarr & Williams, supra n. 2, at 1084-1085.
9. Calculated from the data contained in Table 1-1 in John J. Dinan, The American State Constitu-
tional Tradition, 8-9 (U. Press of Kan. 2006).
10. For additional explanations, see Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conven-
tionphobia, 1 Hofstra L. & Policy Symp. 53, 71-73 (1996). It should be noted that the frequency of
state constitutional conventions in earlier periods was boosted by particular factors that are not present
in the more recent period. In particular, there was a "significant amount of constitutional activity in the
original thirteen states during the Revolutionary Era and in the southern states before, during, and after
the Civil War." Dinan, supra n. 9, at 11. The U.S. Supreme Court's reapportionment rulings also gener-
ated a significant number of conventions in the 1960s. Id. at 10.
11. The limited conventions in Tennessee in 1971 and 1977, Rhode Island in 1973, Louisiana in
1973-1974, and Texas in 1974 are noted in Albert L. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional
Revision: 1978-1979 and the 1970s, 23 Book of the States 10 (Council of St. Govts. 1981). The Texas
Convention of 1974 and the Louisiana Convention of 1992 were comprised solely of legislators. Dinan,
supra n. 9, at 12.
12. These three post-1971 unlimited conventions are noted in Sturm, State Constitutions and Con-
stitutional Revision, supra n. 11, at 9.
396 Vol. 71
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land in 1986),13 each of which enacted notable reforms.14 Mandatory con-
vention referendums, which are available in just over one-quarter of the
states, have therefore been responsible in the contemporary era for more
unlimited conventions featuring elected delegates than have legislatively-
initiated convention calls. Insofar, then, as conventions can be viewed as
beneficial in providing a comprehensive examination of the cumulative ef-
fect of piecemeal amendments, the mandatory convention referendum is
more likely than other mechanisms to allow a convention to be called,
largely because it bypasses the legislature.
My purpose is to glean lessons from the mandatory convention refer-
endums held in the first decade of the 21st century (from 2000 through
2008) about both the obstacles and pathways to their passage. In particular,
I examine and draw lessons from referendums held in the following states
and years: Iowa in 2000; Alaska, Missouri, and New Hampshire in 2002;
Rhode Island in 2004; and Connecticut, Hawaii, and Illinois in 2008.
In one respect, the lessons that emerge from these referendum cam-
paigns concern the obstacles to their passage, given that they all went down
to defeat. In line with established patterns of behavior in mandatory con-
vention referendums, the chief obstacles in the past decade have been, first,
indifference on the part of the general public to state constitutional reform,
and, second, resistance from the political party and allied groups that con-
trol the legislature, together with groups whose policy interests are constitu-
tionally entrenched.
In another respect, even though these referendums all went down to
defeat, in some states they came close to passing, and in others they re-
ceived more support than prior convention referendums in the same state,
thereby making it possible to identify certain pathways to success. First,
referendum proponents will obtain greater support insofar as they are able
in their campaign to increase public knowledge about the constitution in
general and attract public attention to the referendum in particular. Addi-
tionally, referendum proponents can gain support by highlighting popular
13. These four post-1971 conventions called as a result of mandatory convention referendums are
noted in Gerald Benjamin, The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Question Referendum: The New
York Experience in National Context, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 1017, 1020 (2002) [hereinafter Benjamin,
Mandatory Referendum].
14. The work of the New Hampshire Convention of 1974 is discussed in Albert L. Sturm, State
Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1974-1975, 21 Book of the States 169-170 (Council of St.
Govts. 1977). The work of the New Hampshire Convention of 1984 is discussed in Albert L. Sturm and
Janice C. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision: 1984-1985, 26 The Book of the States
5 (Council of St. Govts. 1987). The work of the Hawaii Convention of 1978 is discussed in Sturm, State
Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, supra n. 11, at 11. The work of the Rhode Island Convention
of 1986 is discussed in Maureen Moakley & Elmer Cornwell, Rhode Island Politics and Government
58-59 (U. of Neb. Press 2001).
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institutional reforms and policies that are blocked in the ordinary amend-
ment process.
Such an analysis might contribute to our understanding of the peculiar
political dynamics of mandatory convention referendums, which differ in
important respects from legislatively-initiated convention referendums.' 5
This knowledge might also guide and inform participants in the full set of
mandatory convention referendums slated for the next few years: in Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan, and Montana in 2010, and in Alaska, New Hampshire,
and Ohio in 2012.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANDATORY
CONVENTION REFERENDUM
The mandatory convention referendum device originated in the Massa-
chusetts Constitution of 1780, which was the first American constitution to
be drafted by delegates elected for the specific purpose of drafting a consti-
tution and then to be ratified by the people. 16 Although several other state
constitutions drafted in the late 1770s included provisions for legislative-
enacted amendments, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was the first
to provide a means of taking the sense of the people after a specific interval
of time regarding whether to call a convention to consider revisions to the
document.' 7 Although Thomas Jefferson is viewed as the first and most
avid proponent of generational constitutional revision based on his advo-
cacy of such a plan beginning in the late 1780s,18 the first adoption of such
a device therefore dates to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 drafted
in large part by John Adams.19
According to the relevant provision in the Massachusetts Constitution
of 1780, "In order the more effectually to adhere to the principles of the
constitution, and to correct those violations which by any means may be
made therein, as well as to form such alterations as from experience shall be
found necessary," the Legislature was directed in 1795 to call a vote of the
15. See Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum on Calling a State Constitutional Conven-
tion: Enforcing the People's Right to Reform Their Government, 31 Ohio St. L.J. 421 (1970); Benjamin,
Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13; see also Tarr & Williams, supra n. 2, at 1079-1082; Dinan, The
American State Constitutional Tradition, supra n. 9, at 45-46, 56-57.
16. Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, 17 Publius 153, 155 (Winter
1987).
17. Dinan, supra n. 9, at 45.
18. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jeffer-
son 488, 491-492 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., Random House 1944). For a later and oft-
quoted statement in support of generational revision, see Jefferson, Letter to Samuel Kercheval. Id. at
673, 674-676.
19. Ronald M. Peters Jr., The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact 13 (U. of
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qualified voters in the various towns and plantations "for the purpose of
collecting their sentiments on the necessity or expediency of revising the
constitution." 20 If two-thirds of voters gave their approval, then delegates
would be chosen and a convention would assemble. 2 1 Such a vote was held
as scheduled, and although the referendum received the support of a major-
ity of voters, it did not obtain the necessary two-thirds support, and so no
convention was called.2 2 Because the Massachusetts Constitution did not
provide for another convention referendum to be held after 1795, this was
the final mandatory convention referendum held in the State. 2 3
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 and Kentucky Constitution
of 1792 adopted variations on the Massachusetts procedure. In what is best
described as a mandatory convention provision, rather than a mandatory
convention referendum provision, New Hampshire's 1784 Constitution re-
quired that a convention be called seven years after its adoption, with no
prior vote of the people required. 2 4 Meanwhile, Kentucky's 1792 Constitu-
tion required that a convention referendum be submitted to the people in
1797 and, if approved by a majority of qualified voters, the question be
resubmitted in 1798, at which time a second majority approval would result
in the calling of a convention. 25 Kentucky voters gave their assent in both
years and a convention was held in 1799.26
When the New Hampshire Constitution was amended in 1792, after
the designated seven-year interval, New Hampshire became the first state to
require mandatory convention referendums not just one time but on a recur-
ring basis in perpetuity.27 This 1792 New Hampshire provision stipulated
that a vote be held "after the expiration of seven years from the adoption of
this constitution as amended," to "take the sense of the qualified voters on
the subject of a revision of the constitution," and if a majority of the quali-
fied voters approved, then the legislature was directed to call a conven-
tion.2 8 Moreover, and this represented New Hampshire's distinctive contri-
bution to the development of the mandatory convention referendum, "the
20. Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. X (superseded 1821 by Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. IX).
21. Id.
22. The vote totals were 11,386 in favor, and 10,867 opposed. Martineau, supra n. 15, at 439.
23. Walter F. Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions 43 (Johns Hopkins Press
1910).
24. N.H. Const. pt. 2 art. 99 (1784) (superseded 1792 by N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 99); see Susan E.
Marshall, The New Hampshire Constitution: A Reference Guide, 210-211 (Praeger 2004); The Federal
and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, Colonies
Now or Heretofore Forming Part of the United States vol. IV, 2470 (Francis Thorpe ed., 1909) [herein-
after Federal and State Constitutions]; See Dodd, supra n. 23, at 43.
25. Ky. Const. art. XI (1792) (superseded 1799 by Ky. Const. art. IX).
26. Martineau, supra n. 15, at 442.
27. N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 99 (1784) (amended 1792 by pt I, § 100); see Dodd, supra n. 23, at 50.
28. N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 99 (1784) (repealed and superseded 1980 by N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 100).
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same method of taking the sense of the people as to the revision of the
constitution, and calling a convention for that purpose, shall be observed
afterward, at the expiration of every seven years." 29 When Indiana drafted
its inaugural Constitution of 1816, it followed New Hampshire's model,
albeit with a 12-year interval between submissions. 3 0
The New York Constitution of 1846 made two additional contributions
to the development of the mandatory convention referendum device: by
providing for a mandatory recurring convention referendum to supplement
an existing legislative-initiated amendment procedure 3' and settling on a
20-year interval between submissions.32 Prior to adoption of the New York
Constitution of 1846, the states that had adopted the mandatory convention
referendum device had provided that this was the only means by which the
constitution could be changed. Each state that subsequently adopted this
device followed New York's lead in viewing the mandatory convention ref-
erendum as an auxiliary device rather than as the sole means of undertaking
constitutional change.33 Moreover, although subsequent states varied in the
length of time provided between submissions, 20 years has been the most
popular interval. 34
Counting Massachusetts and Kentucky, with their one-time mandatory
convention referendums, 18 state constitutions have provided for mandatory
convention referendums at some point in American history, and 14 continue
to do so. The 18th century adopters were Massachusetts (1780), Kentucky
(1792), and New Hampshire (1792-present). The 19th century adopters
were Indiana (1816-1851), New York (1846-present), Michigan
(1850-present), Maryland (1851-present), Ohio (1851-present), Iowa
(1857-present), and Virginia (1870-1902). In the 20th century, the device
was adopted by Oklahoma (1907-present), Missouri (1920-present), Ha-
waii (1959-present), Alaska (1959-present), Connecticut (1965-present),
Illinois (1970-present), Montana (1972-present), and Rhode Island
(1973-present).35
29. N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 99 (1784) (amended 1792 by part II, § 100).
30. Ind. Const. art. VI (1816) (superseded 1851 by Ind. Const., which lacked any provision for
calling a constitutional convention); Federal and State Constitutions, supra n. 24, at vol. 2, 1068.
31. Martineau, supra n. 15, at 425.
32. N.Y. Const. art. XIII, § 2 (1846) (superseded 1891 by N.Y. Const. art. XIV, § 2); Federal and
State Constitutions, supra n. 24 at vol. 5, 2672-2673.
33. New Hampshire was for many years an outlier in this regard. It was not until 1964 that the
New Hampshire Constitution was changed to permit the legislature to submit amendments for popular
ratification. Until that point, the only means of changing the New Hampshire Constitution was through
the mandatory convention referendum. Dinan, The American State Constitutional Tradition, supra n. 9,
at 11-12.
34. May, supra n. 16, at 156 n. 15.
35. These dates of adoption are found in Martineau, supra n. 15, at 439-446; Benjamin, Mandatory
Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1019.
400 Vol. 71
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In no instance were these devices enacted through legislative-initiated
amendments. In all but one case, their adoption came through the work of
constitutional conventions.3 6  Missouri alone adopted its mandatory con-
vention referendum device through a constitutional initiative submitted and
approved by voters in 1920.37 Elimination of these devices has occurred
only two times, with the adoption of Indiana's 1851 Constitution and Vir-
ginia's 1902 Constitution, and through the work of revision conventions in
both cases. 38 Legislatures have on occasion sought to eliminate these de-
36. These provisions were originally adopted in the following conventions: Massachusetts Conven-
tion of 1779-1780, Dodd, supra n. 23, at 43; Kentucky Convention of 1792, Robert M. Ireland, The
Kentucky State Constitution: A Reference Guide 3 (Greenwood Press 1999); New Hampshire Conven-
tion of 1791-1792, Marshall, supra n. 25, at 211; Indiana Convention of 1816, William P. McLauchlan,
The Indiana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 4 (Greenwood Press 1996); New York Convention
of 1846, Peter J. Galie, The New York State Constitution: A Reference Guide 13 (Greenwood Press
1991); Michigan Convention of 1850, Susan P. Fino, The Michigan State Constitution: A Reference
Guide 11 (Greenwood Press 1996); Maryland Convention of 1850-185 1, Dan Friedman, The Maryland
State Constitution: A Reference Guide 262 (Praeger 2006); Ohio Convention of 1850-1851, Steven H.
Steinglass and Gino J. Scarselli, The Ohio State Constitution: A Reference Guide 28 (Praeger 2004);
Iowa Convention of 1857, Jack Stark, The Iowa State Constitution: A Reference Guide 10 (Greenwood
Press 1998); Virginia Convention of 1867-1868, John Dinan, The Virginia State Constitution: A Refer-
ence Guide 14 (Praeger 2006); Oklahoma Convention of 1906-1907, Danny M. Adkinson & Lisa Mc-
Nair Palmer, The Oklahoma State Constitution: A Reference Guide 5, 9 (Greenwood Press 2001); Ha-
waii Convention of 1950, Amy K. Trask, A History of Revision: The Constitutional Convention Ques-
tion in Hawai'i, 1950-2008, 31 U. Haw. L. Rev. 291, 291, 301-303 (Winter 2008); Alaska Convention
of 1955-1956, Gerald A. McBeath, The Alaska State Constitution: A Reference Guide 212-215 (Green-
wood Press 1997); Connecticut Convention of 1965, Wesley W. Horton, The Connecticut State Consti-
tution: A Reference Guide 162-163 (Greenwood Press 1993); Illinois Convention of 1969-1970, Marti-
neau, supra n. 15, at 423 n. 9; Montana Convention of 1971-1972, Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The
Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 11, 16 (Greenwood Press 2001); and Rhode Island
Convention of 1973, Patrick T. Conley & Robert G. Flanders Jr., The Rhode Island State Constitution: A
Reference Guide 274-275 (Praeger 2007).
37. Martineau, supra n. 15, at 453-454 n. 54.
38. Dodd, supra n. 23, at 51. On the elimination of Indiana's mandatory convention referendum
device by the Indiana Convention of 1850-1851, see McLauchlan, supra n. 36, at 13-14. On the elimi-
nation of the Virginia mandatory convention referendum device by the Virginia Convention of
1901-1902, see John J. Dinan, The Development of the Virginia Constitution, in The Constitutionalism
of American States 396 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds., U. of Mo. Press 2008)
(noting that the device "was eliminated by a 1901-1902 convention that was so unwilling to permit
popular participation in constitutional change that it did not even submit its own work to the people for
ratification"). Goodrich Hatton, a delegate to the Virginia Convention of 1901-1902 provided the fol-
lowing explanation of the decision to eliminate the device: "The experience of every man in the Com-
monwealth is to the effect that whenever this question has been submitted by the General Assembly
under this provision, no attention has been paid to it by the people. Only once since the adoption of the
present Constitution has that question been submitted, and when submitted, the people of the Common-
wealth were absolutely inattentive to it. They were not prepared for it, it was not discussed, and it went
as a dead letter. When the people went to the polls and voted, a large majority of them did not know the
question was before them or not. The committee very carefully considered that. They concluded that
that provision was an excrescence upon the Constitution, and they determined to eliminate it as abso-
lutely useless and ineffective." Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, State of Virginia, held in the City of Richmond, June 12, 1901, to June 26, 1902 vol. II, 2613 (The
Hermitage Press Inc. 1906).
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vices but have been unsuccessful, as in Oklahoma in 1994 when a legisla-
tive-initiated repeal amendment was rejected by voters.39 Thus, Oklahoma
remains one of the current 14 mandatory convention referendum states,
even if the state legislature has failed to comply with the referendum re-
quirement in recent decades40 and has not submitted such a measure to the
people since 1970.41
As for the intervals between submissions, eight of the 14 current
mandatory convention referendum states require that a vote be held every
20 years: New York, Maryland, Ohio, Oklahoma, Missouri, Connecticut,
Illinois, and Montana. Another state, Michigan, provides for a 16-year in-
terval. Four states provide for a 10-year interval: Iowa, Alaska, and Rhode
Island, along with New Hampshire (which lengthened its previous seven-
year interval in 1964). Hawaii currently requires that a convention referen-
dum be placed on the ballot if a referendum has not been held in the last
nine years. 42
All told, voters throughout U.S. history have given their approval to 30
mandatory convention referendums (the precise number is a matter of dis-
pute, due to controversy over whether some of these met the requisite ap-
proval requirements) and these approvals have led to 25 conventions. 4 3
New Hampshire, where this device was for many years the only route to
constitutional change, produced fully half of these mandatory convention
approvals and resulting conventions, with 15 approvals and 13 conventions:
held in 1850, 1876, 1889, 1902, 1912, 1918, 1930, 1938, 1948, 1956, 1964,
1974, and 1984 (the legislature failed to call conventions after voter approv-
als in 1861 and 1864).4 New York has been responsible for three
mandatory convention approvals and resulting conventions held in 1867,
1894, and 1938.45 Michigan voters have been responsible for two approv-
39. William o. Pitts, Commentary: Plan Sets Parameters for Constitutional Convention Call, J.
Rec. Legis. Rpt. (Mar. 17, 2008) (available at 2008 WLNR 25403400).
40. For a report that this requirement has been "routinely ignored" see Adkinson & Palmer, supra
n. 36, at 299.
41. Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1020.
42. Tarr & Williams, supra n. 2, at 1079.
43. For the data prior to 1970, see Martineau, supra n. 15, at 424, n. 18, 439-446. For the data
after 1970, see Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1020.
44. An 1850 approval led to an 1850 convention. An 1876 approval led to an 1876 convention. An
1887 approval led to an 1889 convention. A 1900 approval led to a 1902 convention. A 1910 approval
led to a 1912 convention. A 1916 approval led to a 1918 convention. A 1928 approval led to a 1930
convention. A 1937 approval led to a 1938 convention. A 1946 approval led to a 1948 convention. A
1954 approval led to a 1956 convention. A 1962 approval led to a 1964 convention. A 1972 approval
led to a 1974 convention. And a 1982 approval led to a 1984 convention. Martineau, supra n. 15, at
439-442; Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1044.
45. An 1866 vote led to a 1867 convention, an 1886 vote led eventually to an 1894 convention, and
a 1936 vote led to a 1938 convention. Martineau, supra n. 15, at 442-443. The 1938 convention is
discussed in Galie, supra n. 25, at 24-27.
402 Vol. 71
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als that both led to conventions (in 1867 and 1961),46 as have Ohio voters
(in 1873 and 1912)47 and Missouri voters (in 1922 and 1943).48 Hawaii
voters approved two referendums that resulted in one convention that was
held in 197849 (as for the other approval in 1996, convention opponents
successfully challenged it in court on the ground that blank votes should
have been counted as no votes,50 and voters went on to reject a 1998 con-
vention referendum submitted by the legislature in the lawsuit's after-
math).5' Kentucky voters gave the requisite approval in successive years to
a referendum that led to a convention held in 1799.52 Rhode Island voters
approved one referendum that led to a convention in 1986.53 Iowa voters
approved a convention referendum in 1920 but the legislature failed to call
a convention and none was held. 5 4 Alaska voters approved a convention
referendum in 1970, but no convention was called because opponents suc-
cessfully challenged the vote on the ground that the ballot language was
misleading,55 and voters went on to disapprove a 1972 convention referen-
dum called in the aftermath of the litigation.5 6 A total of eight states have,
therefore, held conventions as a result of mandatory convention referen-
dums: New Hampshire, New York, Michigan, Ohio, Missouri, Hawaii,
Kentucky, and Rhode Island.
II. USE OF THE MANDATORY CONVENTION REFERENDUM
DEVICE IN THE 2000s
Mandatory convention referendums were submitted to the people on
eight occasions in the first decade of the 21st century.5 7 In one sense, this
period has been characterized by consistency, in that all of these referen-
dums were defeated. But some came closer to passing than others. The
mix of supporters, opponents, and key campaign issues also varied. Before
turning to assess the general patterns and lessons that emerge from this
46. An 1866 vote led to an 1867 convention. A 1961 vote led to a 1961 convention. Id. at 443.
47. An 1871 approval led to an 1873 convention. A 1910 approval led to a 1912 convention. Id. at
444.
48. A 1921 approval led to a 1922 convention. A 1942 approval led to a 1943 convention. Id. at
446.
49. A 1976 approval led to a 1978 convention. Trask, supra n. 36, at 308-309.
50. Id. at 315-317.
51. Id. at 318.
52. Approvals in 1797 and 1798 led to a 1799 convention. Martineau, supra n. 15, at 442.
53. A 1984 approval led to a 1986 convention. Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at
1044; May, supra n. 16, at 155-156.
54. Benjamin F. Shambaugh, The Constitutions of Iowa 281-282 (St. Historical Socy. of Iowa
1934).
55. May, supra n. 16, at 156 n. 16.
56. Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1044.
57. Infra nn. 58-166 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1
CONVENTIONS CALLED AS A RESULT OF MANDATORY
CONVENTION REFERENDUMS



























































period, it is helpful to examine the distinctive nature of the campaigns and
particular outcomes in each of these particular referendums.
A. Iowa (2000)
Since 1857, the Iowa Constitution has mandated that a convention ref-
erendum be placed on the ballot every ten years,58 and the most recent sub-
mission was in 2000. In a campaign marked by a lack of voter interest 59
58. Iowa Const. art X, § 3.
59. Drake University professor Hugh Winebrinner commented: "I would guess the vast majority of
voters were surprised to see it and didn't know what it was about." Kimberly Durnan, Voters Consider
a Constitutional Convention, Associated Press (Nov. 8, 2000).
4(04 Vol. 71
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and an absence of organized support or opposition,60 voters defeated the
referendum by a margin of 66.7% to 33.3%, with 598,318 voters opposing a
convention and 299,972 voters in favor. 61 This 33.3% level of support in
2000 exceeded the 27% of voters who supported the prior mandatory con-
vention referendum in 1990 but was lower than the 39% who supported the
1980 referendum and the 49% who supported the 1970 referendum, which
was the closest that a mandatory convention referendum has come to pass-
ing in Iowa since 1920.62 In that year, a majority of voters supported a
referendum, but the state house and senate were unable to agree on a bill
that would call a convention, and so no convention was held. 6 3
B. Alaska (2002)
The Alaska Constitution has since its inception mandated that a con-
vention referendum be placed before voters at least once every ten years,
and the most recent submission was in 2002.64 This measure attracted little
interest and scant comment in the months preceding the vote. 65 To the ex-
tent that the referendum attracted any attention, supporters emphasized the
need to provide better representation for Native Alaskans and to safeguard
subsistence hunting and fishing. 66 Individuals who expressed their opposi-
tion to a convention stressed the danger of "opening up the entire state
constitution to potential change," 67 among other concerns.
Alaska voters rejected the 2002 referendum by a margin of 71.6% to
28.4%, with 152,120 voters opposing a convention and 60,217 voters ex-
pressing their support.68 This was the lowest level of voter support for a
convention referendum in the brief history of such referendums in Alaska.
The initial referendum in 1970 was narrowly approved with 50.3% sup-
60. Deputy Secretary of State for Elections and Voter Registration Bob Galbraith reported that he
was "not aware of any campaign for or against it." Every 10 years, Iowans Asked Whether Convention
Should Be Held, Associated Press St. and Loc. Wire (Des Moines, Iowa) (Oct. 27, 2000).
61. Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 15, at 1044.
62. Id.
63. Shambaugh, supra n. 54, at 281-282.
64. Alaska Const. art. VI, § 3.
65. For a comment to the effect that the referendum "has been largely ignored to date," see Duane
Heyman, Alaska Constitution Faces Rewrite, Alaska J. of Com. (Sept. 23, 2002) (available at www.
alaskajournal.com/stories/092302/weaconstirution.shtml).
66. Commonwealth North, Shall There Be a Constitutional Convention? 5-6 (Sept. 22, 2002)
(available at http://www.commonwealthnorth.org/documents-cwnorthl2002_constreport.pdf); Mary
Pemberton, Voters Again Asked about a Constitutional Convention, Associated Press (Anchorage,
Alaska) (Oct. 22, 2002) (available at http://alaskalegislature.com/stories/102302/constitutionvote.shtml).
67. Anchorage Chamber of Com. St. and Loc. Govt. Affairs Comm., Issue Paper: Ballot Measure 1
on the November 5, 2002 Ballot (Calling a State Constitutional Convention) 9 (2002) (available at http://
www.anchoragechamber.org/pdf/STATE_LOCAL.pdf) [hereinafter Issue Paper].
68. State of Alaska Division of Elections, Advisory Votes, Propositions and Other Questions on
Alaska's Ballots, http://www.elections.alaska.gov/advisbal.php (updated Jan. 14, 2003).
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port.69 However, opponents filed suit in state court, claiming that the ballot
language was misleading when it asked, "As required by the Constitution of
the State of Alaska, Article XIII, Section 3, shall there be a constitutional
convention?" The court sided with the convention opponents, who con-
tended that this ballot language suggested that the constitution required that
a convention be called rather than merely a referendum on calling a conven-
tion. 70 Accordingly, the referendum was resubmitted to voters in the next
statewide general election, in 1972, with the revised wording, "Shall there
be a constitutional convention?"71 It received only 34.5% of the vote.72
The 1982 and 1992 referendums were also submitted using this revised lan-
guage, and both were also defeated, with supporters obtaining only 40 and
37.3% of the vote, respectively.73
C. Missouri (2002)
By an amendment added to the Missouri Constitution via the constitu-
tional initiative process in 1920, a convention referendum is required to be
held in Missouri every 20 years, and the most recent submission was in
2002.74 In a campaign that attracted little attention from public officials or
the citizenry,75 the 2002 referendum was defeated by a margin of 65.5% to
34.5%, with 1,079,085 voters disapproving of a convention and 569,598
voters expressing their approval. 76 This level of support is comparable to
the results of the 1962 and 1982 referendums, where 36.3% and 30.5% of
voters supported a convention, respectively.77 It stands in contrast, how-
ever, with the results of the two previous referendums in 1921 and 1942,
both of which were approved by voters and led to conventions.78
69. Id.
70. McBeath, supra n. 36, at 215. Boucher v. Bomhoff, 495 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1972).
71. The vote totals in 1972 were 29,192 in favor and 55,389 opposed. State of Alaska, supra n. 68.
72. Commonwealth North, supra n. 66, at 2.
73. The vote totals in 1982 were 63,816 in favor of a convention and 108,319 opposed. The vote
totals in 1992 were 84,929 in favor and 142,735 opposed. State of Alaska, supra n. 68
74. Mo. Const. art. XII, § 3(a).
75. For a comment to the effect that "until recently, many state officials were unaware that the
measure was even on the ballot," see Paul Sloca, Missouri Endures Unusual Political Season, Associ-
ated Press St. and Loc. Wire (Jefferson City, Mo.) (Nov. 3, 2002).
76. Missouri Secretary of State, Official Election Results, State of Missouri General Election-11/
5/2002, http://www.sos.mo.gov/enrweb/allresults.asp?arc=l&eid=87 (accessed Apr. 18 2010).
77. The vote totals in 1962 were 295,972 in favor and 519,499 opposed. Martineau, supra n. 15, at
446. The vote totals in 1982 were 406,446 in favor and 927,056 opposed. Benjamin, Mandatory Refer-
endum, supra n. 13, at 1044.
78. The vote totals in 1921 were 175,355 in favor and 127,130 opposed. The vote totals in 1942
were 366,018 in favor and 265,294 opposed. Martineau, supra n. 15, at 446.
Vol. 71406
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D. New Hampshire (2002)
New Hampshire was the first state to adopt a recurring mandatory con-
vention referendum device (in 1792) and it has made use of this device
more frequently and with more success than any other state (15 approvals
and 13 conventions).79 Originally, the New Hampshire Constitution re-
quired that a convention referendum be placed on the ballot every seven
years, in what served for many years as the only method of changing the
State Constitution. However, in 1964, the Constitution was amended to
permit legislative-initiated amendments and also lengthen the interval be-
tween mandatory convention referendum submissions to the current ten
years.80
The most recent mandatory convention referendum in New Hampshire
took place in 2002 and attracted a fair amount of attention from the media
and public officials. The State's leading newspaper, the Union Leader, ran
a number of articles on the referendum in the lead-up to the vote and then
issued an election-day endorsement.8 1 The referendum was also endorsed
by the Democratic and Republican gubernatorial candidates, albeit for very
different reasons. 8 2 Democratic candidate Mark Fernald supported a con-
vention in the hope that delegates would increase the gubernatorial term
from two to four years and respond to a string of state Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding the State's obligation to increase the State's role in school
funding by authorizing an individual income tax.83 Meanwhile, the ulti-
mately-victorious Republican candidate Craig Benson also viewed a con-
vention as a vehicle for responding to the State court's school-finance deci-
sions,8 4 the most recent of which had been issued in April 2002.85 How-
ever, Benson's preferred constitutional response was quite different; he
sought to limit the State's role in education spending and thereby counteract
the court's rulings, which had resulted in the State requiring a number of
wealthier "donor" towns to send local tax revenue to the State for redistri-
79. Regarding the 11 referendum approvals that led to conventions being called and the two refer-
endums that were approved but did not lead to conventions prior to 1970, see Martineau, supra n. 15, at
424 n. 14-15. Regarding the two referendum approvals that led to conventions being called in New
Hampshire after 1970, see Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1020.
80. Albert L. Sturm, Thirty Years of State Constitution-Making, 1938-1968; With an Epilogue:
Developments During 1969, 62 (Natl. Mun. League 1970).
81. Editorial: Yes on Ballot Questions; Rein in Court, Fix Constitution, Union Leader (Manchester,
N.H.) A12 (Nov. 5, 2002) (available at Lexis, News Library, UNIONL).
82. Fernald, Benson Support Constitutional Convention, Union Leader (Manchester, N.H.) A2
(Oct. 18, 2002) (available at Lexis, News Library, UNIONL).
83. Id.
84. Pat Hammond, Power from the Bottom up: N.H. Voters Have Chance to Call for Real Change
on Nov. 5, New Hampshire Sunday News Al (Oct. 13, 2002).
85. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002).
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bution to poorer "receiver" towns.86 Benson also argued that a convention
might secure passage of a constitutional amendment that would make it
more difficult for the legislature to increase taxes, such as by requiring such
increases to obtain a two-thirds vote in the legislature.87 To be sure, neither
candidate made the convention referendum a centerpiece of his campaign
appeal. Nor did interest groups engage in a concerted advertising campaign
for or against the referendum. In that sense, the referendum did not domi-
nate the political discussion in the weeks preceding the election.88 Never-
theless, the connection that gubernatorial candidates and media commenta-
tors made between the string of school-funding decisions and the work of a
prospective convention elevated the referendum's prominence.89
The 2002 New Hampshire convention referendum came close to pass-
ing-closer than any other convention referendum in the 2000s-but was
defeated by a margin of 50.9% to 49.1%, with 184,042 voters opposing a
convention and 177,721 favoring it.90 This outcome paralleled closely the
previous convention referendum in New Hampshire in 1992, which was
defeated by a margin of 50.8% to 49.2%.91 These outcomes stand in con-
trast, however, with the 1972 and 1982 New Hampshire referendums, both
of which were approved and led to conventions. 92
E. Rhode Island (2004)
Rhode Island is the most recent state to adopt the mandatory conven-
tion referendum device (through the work of a 1973 constitutional conven-
tion), and Rhode Island voters were the last to approve a referendum lead-
ing to a convention (through a 1984 referendum that produced a 1986 con-
vention). 93 The relevant state constitutional provision requires that a
convention question be placed on the ballot if the question has not been
86. Fernald, Benson Support Constitutional Convention, supra n. 82.
87. Id.
88. According to one newspaper account: "Even the top partisan officials in the state acknowledge
that they've been more concerned about getting their candidates elected than educating voters about a
constitutional convention's ramifications." Id.
89. See Eugene Van Loan II, Claremont Ruling Shows It's Time for Constitutional Convention,
Union Leader (Manchester, N.H.) (May 3, 2002) (available at Lexis, News Library, NHNWS).
90. State of New Hampshire Elections Division, State General Election-November 5, 2002, http://
www.sos.nh.gov/general2002/conconsum.htm (accessed Apr. 18, 2010).
91. The vote totals in 1992 were 210,342 in favor and 217,575 opposed. Benjamin, Mandatory
Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1044.
92. The vote totals in 1972 were 96,764 in favor and 73,365 opposed. The vote totals in 1982 were
115,351 in favor and 105,207 opposed. Id. at 1044.
93. Rhode Island's most recent adoption of the mandatory convention referendum is noted in id. at
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submitted in the preceding ten year period.9 4 Additionally, and this is
unique to Rhode Island, prior to the holding of such a referendum, "the
general assembly, or the governor if the general assembly fails to act, shall
provide for a bi-partisan preparatory commission to assemble information
on constitutional questions for the electors." 9 5
The most recent mandatory convention referendum was held in 2004
and generated significant attention from the media, public officials, and a
wide array of interest groups that were quite active in campaigning for and
against the measure. 9 6 The state's leading newspaper, the Providence Jour-
nal, endorsed a convention, 97 as did Republican Governor Don Carcieri98
and the public-interest group Operation Clean Government.99 In expressing
its support for a convention, the Providence Journal identified several wor-
thy constitutional reforms that were unlikely to emerge from the legislature
but stood a chance of being passed in a convention, including adoption of
the gubernatorial line-item veto, creation of an inspector general to watch
over state spending, reform of the judicial selection process, and imposition
of term limits on the speaker of the house. 10 Governor Carcieri, mean-
while, emphasized the ways that a convention could increase the power of
the governor relative to the legislature, such as by adopting the line-item
veto, increasing the percentage of legislators required to override a veto,
and strengthening the governor's hand in the budget process. 101 Other offi-
cials and groups touted the opportunities that a convention would afford to
adopt direct democratic institutions such as the statutory initiative process
that would otherwise be blocked in the legislature. 102
Opponents, meanwhile, pooled their financial resources to campaign
against the convention referendum under the banner, Citizens for Represen-
tative Government. Among the biggest financial contributors to the opposi-
tion campaign were the Rhode Island Federation of Teachers and Health
Professionals, the National Education Association of Rhode Island, the
94. R.I. Const. art. XIV, § 2.
95. Id.
96. Elizabeth Zuckerman, Constitutional Convention Proposal Splits Groups, Associated Press St.
& Loc. Wire (Oct. 19, 2004).
97. Editorial-Vote Yes on Question 2, Providence J. A-08 (Oct. 25, 2004) (available at Lexis,
News Library, RINWS).
98. Zuckerman, supra n. 96.
99. Id.
100. Editorial-Vote Yes on Question 2, supra n. 97.
101. Zuckerman, supra n. 96.
102. See e.g. the comments of State Senator Marc Cote. Liz Anderson, Panel Reports Pros and
Cons of Convention, Providence J. BI (Aug. 26, 2004) (available at Lexis, News Library, RINWS).
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Rhode Island AFL-CIO, and the Rhode Island chapter of the ACLU.103
Common Cause of Rhode Island was also active in opposing the referen-
dum, and its executive director co-authored an influential op-ed in the Prov-
idence Journal the week before the election urging a vote against a conven-
tion.104 Among other things, critics emphasized the financial costs (esti-
mated by the preparatory commission to be over $2,000,000)1o5 and the
possibility that convention-approved measures could threaten civil liber-
tiesI06 and the rights of immigrants and minority groups.107
Opponents prevailed in the 2004 referendum, but by the narrow mar-
gin of 52% to 48%, with 175,601 voters opposed and 162,296 voters in
favor.'08 This referendum obtained much more support than the most re-
cent Rhode Island convention referendum in 1994, which attracted the sup-
port of only 40.6% of voters and marked the only other time, aside from the
initial successful referendum in 1984, that Rhode Island voters have consid-
ered a mandatory convention referendum.109
F. Connecticut (2008)
Since 1965, the Connecticut Constitution has required that a conven-
tion referendum be submitted to voters every 20 years, 10 and the most re-
cent submission was in 2008, in a year that also featured submission of such
referendums in Illinois and Hawaii."' As was also the case with these
other two referendums that year, the Connecticut referendum attracted sig-
nificant attention in the media and from public officials and a wide range of
103. The amount of money contributed by each of these groups to the opposition campaign is re-
ported in Edward Achom, Commentary-Citizens for Special-Interest Government, Providence J. B5
(Dec. 14, 2004) (available at Lexis, News Library, RINWS).
104. Gary Sasse & H. Philip West Jr., Commentary-No Need Now For a Constitutional Conven-
tion, Providence J. B5 (Oct. 28, 2004) (available at Lexis, News Library, RINWS).
105. Anderson, supra n. 102.
106. Sasse & West, supra n. 104.
107. Peter B. Lord, Separation of Powers Wins by Big Margin, Providence J. Al (Nov. 3, 2004)
(available at Lexis, News Library, RINWS).
108. State of Rhode Island, Board of Elections, 2004 General Election, Summary of Federal and
Statewide Races & Referenda, http://www.elections.state.ri.us/electioins/results/2004/generalelection/
summary.php (accessed Apr. 18, 2010).
109. The vote totals in 1984 were 155,337 in favor and 131,648 opposed. Benjamin, Mandatory
Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1044. The vote totals in 1994 were 118,545 in favor and 173,693 opposed.
State of Rhode Island, Board of Elections, 1994 General Election Referenda Summary, http://www.
elections.state.ri.us/elections/results/1994/referenda.php (accessed Apr. 18, 2010).
110. Conn. Const. art XIII, § 2.
111. John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2008, in Book of the States vol. 41, 3, 4
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interest groups.' 12 Moreover, some of these groups, particularly convention
opponents, spent heavily to influence the outcome of the referendum.' 1 3
Prominent convention supporters included Republican Governor M.
Jodi Rell and many Republican legislators, as well as taxpayers and prop-
erty rights groups, and, particularly after the Connecticut Supreme Court
issued an October 10, 2008, ruling legalizing same-sex marriage, social
conservative groups.114 For Governor Rell and many Republican
lawmakers, along with a number of groups that made up an umbrella organ-
ization, the Connecticut Constitution Convention Campaign, the principal
attraction of a convention was that delegates might establish direct demo-
cratic institutions such as the initiative and referendum." 5  Taxpayer and
property-rights groups viewed a convention as the most viable route to en-
acting tax-limitation amendments and securing greater restrictions on the
eminent domain power, especially in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme
Court's 2005 Kelo v. City of New London ruling that sustained a Connecti-
cut city's use of eminent domain for economic development purposes." 6
Meanwhile, the Family Institute of Connecticut was supportive of the refer-
endum throughout the campaign, but a convention took on renewed impor-
tance for this and other social conservative groups and received the strong
endorsement of the Catholic Conference of Connecticut, after the state Su-
preme Court issued its same-sex marriage legalization ruling less than a
month before the election.117 In the view of these groups, a convention
represented the last possible means of changing the Constitution to prevent
the Court's ruling from taking effect or to overturn the decision, in much
the way that California voters relied on the constitutional initiative process
112. Gregory B. Hladky, Conn. Ballot Masks a Battle, Boston Globe (Nov. 3, 2008).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. For the governor's comments on the initiative and referendum in her endorsement of the con-
vention referendum, see Ken Dixon, Rell Favors Constitutional Convention, Conn. Post Online (Sept.
26, 2008) (available at Lexis, News Library, CTNWS). Meanwhile, in an op-ed published in the week
prior to the referendum vote, state Representative Arthur J. O'Neill focused primarily on the benefits of
the initiative and referendum in the course of urging a yes vote on the convention referendum. Arthur J.
O'Neill, Vote Yes for the Constitutional Convention, Conn. Post Online (Bridgeport, Conn.) (Oct. 31,
2008) (available at Lexis, News Library, CTNWS).
116. Susan Haigh, Coalition Pushes for Constitutional Convention, Associated Press St. & Loc.
Wire (Hartford CT) (June 27, 2008).
117. Connecticut Catholic Public Affairs Conference, Connecticut Catholic Conference, on behalfof
the Catholic Bishops, Clergy, Religious, and Laity of the State of Connecticut, Condemns Today's Con-
necticut Supreme Court Decision on Same-sex 'Marriage'; Calls for a 'Yes' Vote on a Constitutional
Convention, http://www.ctcatholic.org/Statement-of-Bishops-on-Court-Same-sex.php (Oct. 10, 2008).
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in November 2008 to overturn the California Supreme Court's same-sex
marriage legalization ruling in May 2008.118
Opposition groups, many of which joined forces under the banner
"Connecticut Vote No: Protect Our Constitution," were more numerous and
far better funded than the supporters." 9 Democratic office-holders and
party officials were strongly opposed to the convention referendum, as typi-
fied by Attorney General Richard Blumenthal's influential op-ed that ap-
peared in the Connecticut Post on the Sunday prior to the referendum and
charged, among other things, that "a constitutional convention opens a Pan-
dora's box of unknowns and uncertainties." 20 Other prominent groups in
the opposition coalition included the state chapters of the AFL-CIO and
UAW, the Connecticut Education Association, the state chapters of the Na-
tional Organization for Women and Planned Parenthood, the ACLU, and
gay and lesbian groups.121 According to published reports late in the cam-
paign, the opposition Connecticut Vote No coalition raised $866,000, in
comparison with $15,000 for the supportive Connecticut Constitutional
Convention Campaign.122
Although a University of Connecticut/Hartford Courant poll released
a week prior to the election indicated that 50% of respondents favored a
convention, compared with 39% who were opposed,12 3 the referendum was
rejected at the polls by a margin of 59.4% to 40.6 %, with 847,518 voters
opposing a convention and 579,904 voters in favor.124 This level of sup-
port, although clearly a large drop-off from polls taken a week out from the
vote, was slightly higher than the 34.5% of voters who supported the only
other mandatory convention referendum held in Connecticut in 1986.125
118. Pat Eaton Robb, Marriage Ruling Not the End of Debate in Conn., Associated Press St. & Loc.
Wire (Hartford, Conn) (Oct. 11, 2008). The California constitutional amendment is discussed in Dinan,
State Constitutional Developments in 2008, supra n. 111, at 5.
119. Hladky, supra n. 112, at Bl.
120. Richard Blumenthal, Vote No on the Constitutional Convention, Conn. Post Online (Bridgeport,
Conn.) (Nov. 2, 2008).
121. Ken Dixon, Group Opposes Constitutional Convention, Conn. Post Online (Bridgeport, Conn.)
(Sept. 17, 2008); Ken Dixon, State Debates Constitutional Convention, Conn. Post Online (Oct. 27,
2008).
122. Hladky, supra n. 112, at Bl.
123. Id.
124. State of Connecticut, Secretary of the State, November 4, 2008 State Election, Constitutional
Questions on the Ballot, www.sots.ct.gov/sots/lib/sots/electionservices/electionresults/2008 election-re-
sults/constitutional-questions-on-the ballot.pdf (accessed Apr. 18, 2010).
125. The vote totals in 1986 were 207,704 in favor and 379,812 opposed. Benjamin, Mandatory
Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1044.
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G. Hawaii (2008)
Drafters of the initial Hawaii Constitution of 1950, drawing on the
recommendation and language of the National Municipal League's Model
Constitution, 126 provided that if a ten-year period elapsed without submis-
sion of a convention referendum, the lieutenant governor should place the
question on the ballot at the next general election. 127 This interval was then
changed slightly after a legal dispute in November 1976 over whether the
lieutenant governor should place a convention referendum on the ballot,
because election day technically fell several days shy of ten years after the
last legislative-initiated referendum in November 1966.128 The Lieutenant
Governor was initially hesitant to submit the referendum in light of this
technicality, but the League of Women Voters sued to force a referendum
submission, and at that point the Legislature agreed to place the referendum
before voters.129 This 1976 referendum was approved by voters, and at the
resulting 1978 Convention, delegates addressed this technical issue by mod-
ifying the relevant constitutional language to require a referendum submis-
sion at the next general election after nine years had elapsed from the last
convention referendum.13 0 Hence Hawaii currently has a nine year submis-
sion requirement, which is the shortest interval between submissions of any
of the mandatory convention referendum states.
Hawaii is the last state where more voters approved than opposed a
mandatory convention referendum: in 1996. However, this did not lead to a
convention. Although yes-votes exceeded no-votes, a good number of vot-
ers left the convention question on their ballot blank.' 3 ' The attorney gen-
eral interpreted the constitutional provision as not requiring her to count
these blank ballots. 132 But the state AFL-CIO, a leading convention oppo-
nent, filed suit against this decision, arguing for a contrary interpretation of
the relevant constitutional provision that would have resulted in the defeat
of the referendum.133 The state Supreme Court, in a 1997 decision, sided
with convention opponents.134 At that point, convention supporters filed
suit in federal court and secured a U.S. District Court ruling ordering that a
126. On the influence of the Model State Constitution in leading states in the second half of the
twentieth century to adopt the mandatory convention referendum, see id. at 1019.
127. Trask, supra n. 36, at 302-303.
128. Id. at 308.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 311.
131. The vote totals were 163,869 in favor, 160,153 opposed, and 45,245 blank votes. State of
Hawaii, Office of Elections, General Election-State of Hawaii-Statewide, November 5, 1996, Sum-
mary Report 5, www.hawaii.gov/elections/results/1996/general/96swgen.pdf (accessed Apr. 18, 2010).
132. Trask, supra n. 36, at 316.
133. Id.
134. Haw. St. AFL-CIO v. Yoshina, 935 P.2d 89 (Haw. 1997); see also Trask, supra n. 36, at 316.
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new election be held.' 35 Although this ruling was eventually reversed by
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,13 6 the Legislature nevertheless decided to
submit a convention referendum at the 1998 general election, where it was
soundly defeated.13 7 Thirty-four percent of voters supported the measure;
fifty-nine percent opposed it; and seven percent left that question blank.' 38
The most recent mandatory referendum submission in 2008 did not
generate any legal challenges of the sort seen in 1976 and 1996, but it did
attract significant attention from public officials and an array of well-organ-
ized and well-funded groups. Chief supporters included Republican Gover-
nor Linda Lingle and Lieutenant Governor James "Duke" Aiona and the
state Republican Party.139 Although convention supporters lacked a major
galvanizing issue of the sort found in other mandatory convention referen-
dum campaigns, various groups and individuals, some allied under the ban-
ner "It's Time Hawaii," 140 viewed a convention as a useful vehicle for en-
acting particular constitutional reforms, such as adopting legislative term
limits and dividing the State's unique statewide school system into districts
governed by local school boards.141
Opponents were well organized and well funded. The state Demo-
cratic Party and most Democratic officials opposed a convention, as did an
umbrella group, the Hawaii Alliance, comprised primarily of public and
private employee unions and Native Hawaiian groups. 142 The Hawaii Alli-
ance raised over $832,000 to oppose the convention, 143 with the National
Education Association Ballot Measure Fund alone contributing $350,000,
and the Hawaii Government Employees Association, the Hawaii State
Teachers Association, and the University of Hawaii Professional Assembly
contributing $10,000 each. 144 These individuals and groups were motivated
by a wide range of concerns about a convention. Democrats argued that a
convention might enable members of the minority Republican Party to gain
135. Trask, supra n. 36, at 317.
136. Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1998).
137. Trask, supra n. 36, at 317-318.
138. The vote totals were 140,688 in favor and 244,753 opposed, with 26,784 blank votes. State of
Hawaii, Office of Elections, General Election-State of Hawaii-Statewide, November 3, 1998, Sum-
mary Report 5 (1998), www.hawaii.gov/elections/results/1998/general/98swgen.pdf (accessed Apr. 18,
2010).
139. Derrick DePledge, Call for Constitutional Convention, Honolulu Advertiser (Oct. 12, 2008)
(available at Lexis, News Library, HONADV).
140. Mark Spengler, Con-Con Could Reenergize State and Re-empower the People, Honolulu Star-
Bulletin (Oct. 31, 2008) (available at http://www.starbulletin.com/editorials/20081031_Con Con-could
re-energizestateandre-empowerjthe-people.html).
141. DePledge, supra n. 139.
142. Trask, supra n. 36, at 319.
143. Id.
144. Mark Niesse, Hawaii Has Battle over Constitutional Redo, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire
(Oct. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Niesse, Constitutional Redo].
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more power for their policy goals than was otherwise possible in the Demo-
crat dominated legislature.14 5 Public employee unions were concerned that
a convention might eliminate the existing constitutional guarantee of collec-
tive bargaining rights.14 6 Teachers unions were also concerned about the
possibility that a convention would divide the single statewide school sys-
tem into local districts with opportunities for variation in decision-making
about K-12 schools. 14 7 Finally, some Native Hawaiian groups feared that a
convention might eliminate some of the existing constitutional protections
for Native Hawaiians.14 8
The 2008 referendum was defeated handily. Only 33.5% of voters
(152,596) in the election voted for it, whereas 61.9% of voters (281,668) in
the election voted against it, and another 4.6% of voters (20,796) who par-
ticipated in some aspect of the election (which included the presidential
contest between John McCain and Barack Obama) left the convention refer-
endum portion of their ballot blank.14 9 Because of the state Supreme Court
ruling arising from the previous disputed referendum, blank ballots are
counted as negative votes, meaning that the 2008 referendum failed by a
66.5% to 33.5% margin, an outcome that was virtually unchanged from the
prior 1998 referendum results.150
H. Illinois (2008)
The Illinois Constitution has since 1970 required that a convention ref-
erendum be submitted every 20 years,15 ' and the second and most recent
submission in 2008 generated significant attention from public officials and
groups that organized for and against a convention. Lieutenant Governor
Pat Quinn was the most high profile supporter of a convention; in fact, he
was the only statewide official to back a convention, 5 2 viewing it as the
only means of adopting direct democratic reforms such as the statutory ini-
tiative, referendum, and recall, as well as ethics reforms.1 53 Members of a
145. Hawaii Democrats May Boost Obama, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire (May 23, 2008).
146. Niesse, Constitutional Redo, supra n. 144.
147. Loren Moreno, Con Con Could Jeopardize Hawaii School System, Opponents Say, Honolulu
Advertiser (Oct. 27, 2008) (available at Lexis, News Library, HONADV).
148. Mark Niesse, Hawaii Considers Constitutional Change, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire (Jan.
27, 2008) [hereinafter Niesse, Hawaii Considers Constitutional Change].
149. State of Hawaii, Office of Elections, General Election-State ofHawaii-Statewide, November
4, 2008, Summary Report 3, www.hawaii.gov/elections/results/2008/generallfiles/histatewide.pdf (ac-
cessed Apr. 18, 2010).
150. Trask, supra n. 36, at 319.
151. Ill. Const. art. XIV, § 1(b).
152. Kurt Erickson, Most State Officials Oppose Convention, The Pentagraph (Bloomington, Ill.) A7
(Oct. 26, 2008) (available at Lexis, News Library, ILNWS).
153. Mark Brown, Here's a Real Chance to Fix Springfield; Many Oppose Rewriting State Constitu-
tion-But Why?, Chi. Sun Times A6 (Oct. 12, 2008) (available at Lexis, News Library, ILNWS); Rupa
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new organization founded by Bruno Behrend and John Bambanek, the Illi-
nois Citizens' Coalition, also campaigned for a convention on the grounds
that it would adopt direct democratic reforms that would increase citizen
influence in state government.154 Other supporters touted a convention as a
way to provide a more equitable school finance system that relied less heav-
ily on property taxes.'55 Meanwhile, the Chicago Tribune was the most
high profile media outlet to endorse a convention call.156
Convention opponents were well organized and funded and brought
together a number of diverse groups that did not often find themselves on
the same side of political battles. The Alliance to Protect the Illinois Con-
stitution included not only union groups (the Illinois AFL-CIO and Illinois
Federation of Teachers), and other traditional allies such as the Illinois Trial
Lawyers Association, but also included business groups (the state chapters
of the Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, and Retail Merchants
Association) and the Illinois Farm Bureau, along with the state chapter of
the League of Women Voters.157 As James Mays, President of the Illinois
Business Roundtable, noted, "It's no secret that the people in this alliance
rarely agree on much. But we all agree on this."' 58 The Alliance spent
over $600,000 in opposing the convention. ' 59 Meanwhile, the Chicago Sun
Times editorialized against a convention, in part on the ground that it "eas-
ily might be dominated by single-issue crusaders" and, moreover, "[o]nce
the Constitution is thrown open, anything goes." 60
One aspect of the Illinois convention referendum campaign that at-
tracted further attention to the referendum and drew the ire of convention
backers was a decision by the State Board of Elections to include ballot
language and instructions that Cook County Circuit Judge Nathaniel Howse
Jr. deemed misleading and false in a ruling issued a month prior to the
election. The instructions stated that the failure to vote on this measure
would be equivalent to a negative vote, which was not technically correct
because the convention referendum can pass either by securing three-fifths
Shenoy, Illinois voters have chance to change constitution, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire (Chicago,
Ill.) (Oct. 12, 2008).
154. Bruno Behrend, Illinois Voters Need Not Fear a Con-con, Chi. Daily Herald 10 (Oct. 27, 2008)
(available at Lexis, News Library, ILNWS).
155. James Houlihan, If You Care about Schools and Property Taxes. . ., Chi. Trib. (Oct. 17, 2008)
(available at Lexis, News Library, ILNWS).
156. See Brown, supra n. 153.
157. Adriana Colindres, Alliance Wants to Prevent Constitutional Convention, St. J. Register 16
(July 15, 2008) (available at Lexis, News Library, ILNWS).
158. Id.
159. Rupa Shenoy, Ill. Voters Defeat Convention Referendum, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire
(Chicago, Ill.) (Nov. 5, 2008).
160. Don't Vote for a New Constitutional Convention, Chi. Sun Times 18 (Oct. 7, 2008) (available at
Lexis, News Library, ILNWS).
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of those voting on the question or a majority voting in the entire election, as
argued in a lawsuit filed by Lieutenant Governor Quinn and the Chicago
Bar Association.'6 1 Additionally, the official explanation of the ballot mea-
sure noted (unnecessarily in the view of the complainants) that a prior con-
vention referendum had been submitted in 1988 and had been defeated by a
margin of 75% to 25%.162 In a ruling issued in October 2008, prior to the
election but after many ballots had already been printed, Judge Howse
found that this ballot language did not comport with the constitutional re-
quirement but that it was too late to order the ballots to be reprinted.163
Instead, he directed elections officials to distribute a handout at the polls
containing corrected language.1"
The 2008 Illinois referendum was defeated by a margin of 67.3% to
32.7%, with 3,044,406 voters supporting a convention, 1,480,441 voters op-
posing a convention, and 1,003,871 voters leaving that question blank.165
The level of popular support in 2008 exceeded the 25% who supported the
1988 referendum but fell far short of the 60% needed to call a conven-
tion. 166
III. OBSTACLES TO SECURING PASSAGE OF MANDATORY
CONVENTION REFERENDUMS
A review of these eight defeated referendums from 2000-2008 is use-
ful in part in illustrating the significant obstacles to passage of mandatory
convention referendums. Scholars have taken due note of the low approval
rate of mandatory convention referendums in comparison with the high ap-
proval rate of legislative-initiated convention calls, as typified by Janice
May's observation two decades ago that "[o]verall, most convention calls
are approved, but the automatic calls are frequently rejected."1 67 These
cases from 2000-2008 provide no warrant for revising this longstanding
view of the difficulty in securing approval of mandatory convention refer-
endums. These recent cases are of interest, however, in helping to explain
this low approval rate, by illustrating the principal obstacles that stand in
the way of their passage and would need to be confronted by individuals
seeking to build support for such referendums in future years.




165. Illinois County Vote Totals on Con-Con Referendum (2008), http://progressillinois.com/2008/
11/21/con-con-county-map (accessed Apr. 18, 2010).
166. The vote totals in 1988 were 900,109 in favor and 2,727,144 opposed. Benjamin, Mandatory
Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1044.
167. May, supra n. 16, at 156.
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TABLE 2
RESULTS OF MANDATORY CONVENTION REFERENDUMS FROM 2000-2008
Percent of Voters
Year State Supporting a Convention Result
2000 Iowa 33.3% Failed
2002 Alaska 28.4% Failed
Missouri 34.5% Failed
New Hampshire 49.1% Failed
2004 Rhode Island 48.0% Failed




One obstacle to passage of mandatory convention referendums is the
marked indifference of the public to state constitutional reform. Citizen
indifference to state constitutional reform is a longstanding phenomenon
that is a product in part of the low level of citizen knowledge about state
constitutions. Indeed, "[M]ost citizens, including many who vote regularly
in representative elections and are otherwise quite knowledgeable about
politics, know very little about their state constitution."l 6 8 Moreover, be-
cause of "the essentially abstract (and even abstruse) issues reform efforts
involve," 69 it can be difficult for citizens to inform themselves about pro-
posed state constitutional reforms and to make connections between these
reforms and the way that the state is governed, much less their own lives.
After all, "It is extraordinarily difficult to excite most citizens about and
give them a stake in the composition of the State Board of Apportionment
or the constitutional status of legislative interim committees," among the
various topics covered in state constitutions. 7 0
Citizen indifference to state constitutional reform makes it difficult to
secure passage of mandatory convention referendums because voters who
are not knowledgeable or not confident in their knowledge about ballot
168. John Dinan, Accounting for Success and Failure of Southern State Constitutional Reform,
1978-2008, 3 Charleston L. Rev. 483, 522 (2009).
169. Elmer E. Cornwell Jr., Jay S. Goodman & Wayne R. Swanson, State Constitutional Conven-
tions: The Politics of the Revision Process in Seven States 193 (Praeger 1975).




Montana Law Review, Vol. 71 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol71/iss2/6
2010 STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION REFERENDUMS 419
measures are apt to vote against them.' 7 1 Scholars who have studied voter
behavior on ballot measures in general have consistently found that individ-
uals who lack knowledge about a ballot measure are more likely to vote
against such a measure, if they decide to vote at all on the question.17 2 In
much the same way that research has consistently shown that voters with
relatively low information in representative elections tend to vote for the
incumbent, voters with low information in referendum campaigns will de-
fault to a no vote on these measures.' 73
Moreover, research on state constitutional amendment ballot measures
indicates that citizens are more likely to oppose such amendments when
they are generated through initiative petitions rather than referred by the
legislature.174 Recent evidence demonstrates that fewer than half of consti-
tutional amendments generated by initiative petition are approved, whereas
over two-thirds of constitutional amendments referred by legislatures are
approved.' 7 5
Citizen indifference to state constitutional reforms poses a particular
problem when it comes to securing passage of mandatory convention refer-
endums as opposed to legislative-initiated convention referendums. When
a legislature approves a convention call and submits it to the people, there is
a much greater likelihood that the referendum vote will have been preceded
by substantial discussion among public officials and in the media. Such
discussion tends to increase citizen knowledge about state constitutions and
build confidence in their capacity to pass judgment on the wisdom of con-
stitutional reform. There is no guarantee that such discussion and coverage
will take place when the convention question is placed on the ballot auto-
matically, without any necessary participation of legislators in the process.
Citizen indifference contributed to the defeat of several of the
mandatory convention referendums held from 2000-2008. In some in-
stances, most notably in Iowa in 2000 and Alaska and Missouri in 2002,
there was virtually no discussion about the pending referendum among pub-
lic officials or in the media. This absence of attention increased the likeli-
171. For an argument that low visibility for a convention referendum tends "to make calling it seem
more risky" and thus reduces its chances of passage, see Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13,
at 1017.
172. Shaun Bowler & Todd Donovan, Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting, & Direct Democracy
33-35 (U. of Mich. Press 1998).
173. Id.
174. Dinan, State Constitutional Developments, supra n. Ill , at 3.
175. Id. at 5. In 2004-2005, voters approved only 43.6% of constitutional amendments generated by
initiative petition, but they approved 74.8% of constitutional amendments referred by the legislature. In
2006-2007, voters approved only 33.3% of amendments generated by initiative petition, but they ap-
proved 86.8% of amendments referred by the legislature. In 2008, voters approved 41.4% of amend-
ments generated by initiative petition, but they approved 66.7% of amendments referred by the legisla-
ture. Id.
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hood that citizens would vote against unfamiliar measures. 7 6 These partic-
ular referendums did not generate substantial opposition; so their failure
cannot be attributed to the work of opposition groups. Rather, they met
with decided indifference, which contributed to their defeat.
In other instances, particularly in Rhode Island in 2004 and Hawaii,
Illinois, and Connecticut in 2008, citizen indifference had the effect of ena-
bling critics-and each of these referendums generated substantial criti-
cism-to sow doubts in the minds of voters by stressing the unpredictable
nature of a convention.177 As Alan Tarr has noted, "Because voters typi-
cally do not have deep-seated convictions about whether or not a conven-
tion shall be called," 78 they are more receptive to arguments that a conven-
tion would unnecessarily and unwisely open a Pandora's Box of issues in
an unpredictable fashion. Arguments of this sort were advanced in each of
these referendum campaigns.179
B. Opposition from In-Power Officials and In-Power and
Constitutionally Favored Groups
A second obstacle to passage of mandatory convention referendums is
opposition from the dominant legislative party and groups allied with that
party as well as groups whose interests are currently protected by constitu-
tional provisions. Each of these groups runs the risk of losing power, albeit
for different reasons, in the event a mandatory convention referendum is
approved and a convention held. Moreover, a convention called pursuant to
176. On the lack of attention to the referendum in Iowa in 2000, see Durnan, supra n. 59. On the
lack of attention to the referendum in Alaska in 2002, see Heyman, supra n. 65. On the lack of attention
to the referendum in Missouri in 2002 and the way this posed an obstacle to its passage, see Paul Sloca,
Voters Could Call for Constitutional Convention, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire (Jefferson City,
Mo.) (Oct. 19, 2002) ("David Webber, a political scientist at the University of Missouri-Columbia and a
close observer of state government said the lack of public interest in the measure makes it an unlikely
candidate for voter approval.").
177. For examples of critics' deployment of this type of argument, see the comments in Rhode
Island in 2004 of H. Philip West Jr., as reported in Anderson, Panel Reports Pros and Cons of Conven-
tion, supra n. 102; the comments in Illinois in 2008 of Laurie Berger, as reported in M.K. Guetersloh,
Groups Spell Out Opposition to Constitutional Convention, The Pentagraph (Bloomington, IL) A4 (Oct.
29, 2008); the comments in Hawaii in 2008 of Roger Takabayashi, as reported in Niesse, Constitutional
Redo, supra n. 144; and the comments in Connecticut in 2008 of Richard Blumenthal, as reported in Pat
Eaton-Robb, Conn. Voters Decide Not to Change Constitution, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire (Hart-
ford, CT) (Nov. 5, 2008).
178. G. Alan Tarr, Introduction, in State Constitutions for the Twenty-First Century: The Politics of
State Constitutional Reform vol. 1, 1, 11 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., St. U. of N.Y. Press
2006).
179. This argument is ubiquitous in convention referendum debates. See Tarr & Williams, supra n.
2 at 1085. For examples of critics' deployment of this argument, see No Need for Convention; Iowa
Referendum: State Constitution Does Not Need an Overhaul, Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, Iowa) A4
(Nov. 3, 2000) (available at Lexis, News Library, TELHLD); Issue Paper, supra n. 67, at 9; Sasse &
West, supra n. 104.
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a mandatory referendum is particularly dangerous to these groups' interests,
and certainly more so than a convention called at the initiative of the legis-
lature. When the legislature drafts a convention call, in-power groups can
often explicitly limit the agenda of a convention, as was done on numerous
occasions in the late 20th century.'8 0 They can also control who partici-
pates in a convention (as was done most notably when the legislatures of
Texas in 1974 and Louisiana in 1992 called conventions comprised solely
of legislators themselves).' 8 In-power groups, however, have much less
ability to limit and control conventions held pursuant to mandatory conven-
tion referendums. And, therefore, they have a much greater incentive and
work more diligently to secure the defeat of mandatory convention referen-
dums than legislative-initiated convention calls, which of course they play a
major role in crafting.
Officials, and particularly legislators, of the dominant political party
were some of the chief opponents of mandatory convention referendums in
several states from 2000-2008.182 Legislatures have long been considered
"natural enemies of unlimited constitutional conventions."1 8 3 In part, this is
because constitutional reforms adopted by state conventions have tended,
over time, to reduce the power of the legislature relative to other institu-
tions. 18 4 Moreover, legislators are reluctant to cede control over the politi-
cal agenda to convention delegates,185 especially given that conventions
have often provided valuable training and opportunities for the emergence
of politically talented individuals who might be seen as rivals to legislative
leaders.18 6 Dominant-party legislators are particularly wary of allowing
members of the out-of-power party to place their preferred policy issues on
the political agenda and possibly secure their passage, as is possible in an
unlimited convention.
Opposition from dominant-party legislators was particularly evident in
Connecticut, Hawaii, and Illinois in 2008, where Democrats controlled both
legislative chambers and worked hard to defeat referendums seen as provid-
ing potential openings for Republicans in each of these states. In Hawaii,
although a few Democratic legislators expressed support for a convention,
the Associated Press reported that a number of Democratic Party members
were opposed because they "said it would be used by Republicans to gain
power outside of the state Legislature, which Democrats control with more
180. Sturm, supra n. 80 at 62.
181. Dinan, supra n. 9, at 12.
182. Infra nn. 187-189.
183. Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1022.
184. Id. at 1021.
185. Id.
186. Tarr, supra n. 178, at 7; Trask, supra n. 36, at 323-324.
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than an 80% majority in both houses."187 In Connecticut, Democrats were
among the chief opponents, on the ground, as University of Connecticut
Law Professor Richard Kay noted in the lead-up to the referendum, that
"[t]he 'ins' don't want a constitutional convention because they're in."18 8
In Illinois, Democratic officials were also invariably opposed to a referen-
dum, although in this case, they were joined in opposition by a number of
Republicans. 189
Dominant-party legislators are not the only individuals who stand to
lose in the event a convention is called and the minority party is given a
chance to gain access to the political agenda and re-open heretofore settled
issues. Interest groups allied with the dominant party have a similar incen-
tive to prevent such conventions,190 and they contributed to the defeat of
several convention referendums from 2000-2008. Private and public-em-
ployee unions are among the chief allies of the Democratic Party, and it is
no surprise that unions played a major role in campaigning against conven-
tion referendums wherever Democrats controlled the state legislature.191
Union opposition was especially evident in Rhode Island in 2004192 and in
Connecticut, 193 Hawaii, 194 and Illinois 19 5 in 2008. Teachers unions spent
particularly heavily to defeat some of these referendums, especially in Ha-
waii, where the National Education Association Ballot Measure Fund alone
contributed $350,000 to the opposition campaign in that state. 19 6 Trial law-
yers are also closely allied with the Democratic Party in most states and
187. Hawaii Democrats May Boost Obama, supra n. 145. For the official stance of the Democratic
Party in Hawaii, see DePledge, supra n. 139.
188. Dixon, supra n. 121.
189. Brown, supra n. 153 (noting that "Not only do the state's leading Democratic officials say you
should vote 'no,' but so do the state's leading Republicans"). Brown argued: "Simply put, these are the
powers that be. They're comfortable with the way things are. They've got their share of the power and
the ability to exert their will on the process. Everything doesn't always go their way, but they have a
seat at the table, and with that comes a certain level of predictability about what influence they can have
on public policy." Id.
190. On the general expectation of opposition from "[p]articular interests with established legislative
relationships," see Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1050.
191. For the critical role played by unions in opposing a prior convention referendum in New York
in 1997, see id. at 1040.
192. In the aftermath of the referendum vote, Edward Achorn, the deputy editorial-pages editor of
the state's leading newspaper, The Providence Journal, took note of the significant financial contribu-
tions from unions to the opposition campaign and argued, "They already control the General Assembly,
and thus hold a near monopoly on political power at the state level. Controlling a majority of 75 newly
elected convention delegates would have been expensive or impossible. And those citizens might have
stirred up trouble for the public-employee unions ..... Achorn, supra n. 103.
193. See Dixon, supra n. 121.
194. See Trask, supra n. 36, at 319.
195. For an argument that in Illinois, unions, among other groups, were worried that "people from
outside the normal channels" would be "allowed an opportunity to tinker with the state Constitution"
and "it might upset that balance of power and put them at a disadvantage," see Brown, supra n. 153.
196. Niesse, Constitutional Redo, supra n. 144.
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were active in opposing some of these referendums out of a concern that a
convention could provide an opening for Republicans and their allied
groups to engage with tort reform or other issues that had been settled or
submerged by the dominant party.'97
Opposition also stemmed from a different quarter: from groups whose
policy interests were protected not so much by the dominant party through
the legislative process but rather by entrenched constitutional provisions
that worked in their favor. These latter groups-and there is some overlap
in that several groups are advantaged both by their alliance with the domi-
nant legislative party and by favorable constitutional provisions-work to
defeat referendums out of a fear that a convention will eliminate or other-
wise alter these existing constitutional protections.198
Public-employee unions are the leading example of a group that occa-
sionally opposed referendums because the resulting conventions might
threaten Democratic and allied-group control of the political agenda and
might also erode existing constitutional protections for collective bargain-
ing rights and pensions. It was in part a concern with protecting the collec-
tive-bargaining rights provision in the Hawaii Constitution that led public-
employee unions to campaign heavily against a convention referendum in
Hawaii in 2008.199 A concern with preserving an existing pension and re-
tirement rights provision in the Illinois Constitution played a role in driving
public-employee union opposition in Illinois in 2008.200
Various other groups also opposed convention referendums out of a
concern with preserving existing constitutional provisions. In Hawaii in
2008, Native Hawaiian groups sought to prevent any erosion in a constitu-
tional provision that establishes the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and contains
important guarantees of their interests.201 In Rhode Island in 2004 and
Connecticut in 2008, state chapters of the ACLU opposed convention refer-
endums out of a concern that existing bills-of-rights provisions, whether
regarding free speech or search and seizure or various other civil liberties,
might be altered in a resulting convention. 202 And in Illinois in 2008, the
state chapter of the NRA joined the opposition campaign, presumably out
197. On the opposition of trial lawyers in Illinois, see Colindres, supra n. 157.
198. This logic is detailed and examples from the New York referendum in 1997 are supplied in
Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1039. See also Benjamin & Gais, supra n. 10, at 70;
Sturm, supra n. 80, at 64.
199. Niesse, Constitutional Redo, supra n. 144.
200. This opposition argument was noted in Behrend, supra n. 154.
201. See the comments of Office of Hawaiian Affairs Chairwoman Haunani Apoliona, as reported in
Niesse, Hawaii Considers Constitutional Change, supra n. 148.
202. ACLU opposition and financial contributions to the opposition campaign in Rhode Island are
reported in Anderson, supra n. 102. ACLU opposition in Connecticut is reported in Dixon, supra n.
121.
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of a desire to preserve a right-to-bear-arms guarantee that had been added to
the Illinois Constitution in 1970 and could have been put at risk in a result-
ing convention. 203
IV. PATHWAYS To APPROVAL
Although in one respect the defeat of all eight mandatory convention
referendums from 2000-2008 illustrates the continuing obstacles to their
passage, it is noteworthy that several came very close to passage or led in
the polls until late in the day. The New Hampshire referendum in 2002
came closest to passing, losing by a narrow margin of 50.9% to 49.1%.204
The Rhode Island referendum in 2004 was also quite close, failing by a
margin of 52% to 48%.205 Meanwhile, the Connecticut referendum in 2008
was passing by an 11-point margin in an independent poll taken a week
before the election,2 0 6 before it was defeated by a wide margin of 59.4% to
40.6%.207 In each of these instances, the mandatory convention referen-
dums stood some chance of passing.
In another three instances-in Iowa in 2000, Missouri in 2002, and
Illinois in 2008- convention referendums failed by wide margins but se-
cured more public support than the last time a referendum was submitted in
each of those states. (The referendum had 33.3% support in Iowa as com-
pared with 27% support for the prior referendum in that state, 34.5% sup-
port in Missouri as compared with 30.5% support for the prior referendum,
and 32.7% support in Illinois as compared with 25% support in the previous
referendum 208). Only in Alaska in 2000 and Hawaii in 2008 were support
levels either virtually unchanged or lower than the last time the measure
was put to a vote in each state. 2 0 9
203. Brown, supra n. 153.
204. State of New Hampshire Elections Division, State General Election - November 5, 2002, supra
n. 90.
205. State of Rhode Island, Board of Elections, 2004 General Election, supra n. 109.
206. Hladky, supra n. 112.
207. State of Connecticut, Secretary of the State, November 4, 2008 State Election, supra n. 124.
208. On Iowa, see the data for 1990 and 2000 in Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at
1044. On Missouri, see the data for 2002, as reported in Missouri Secretary of State, Official Election
Results, State of Missouri General Election-l 1/5/2002, supra n. 76, and the data for 1982, as reported
in Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1044. On Illinois, see the data for 2008, as re-
ported in Illinois County Vote Totals on Con-Con Referendum (2008), supra n. 165, and the data for
1988, as reported in Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1044.
209. In Alaska, the 2002 support level of 28.4% was much lower than the 1992 support level of
37.3%. See data reported in State of Alaska, Division of Elections, Advisory Votes, Propositions and
Other Questions on Alaska's Ballots, supra n. 68. In Hawaii, the 2008 support level of 33.5% was
virtually unchanged from the 34% support level in 1998. The 2008 data is reported in State of Hawaii,
Office of Elections, General Election-State of Hawaii-Statewide, November 4, 2008, Summary Re-
port, supra n. 149, at 3. The 1998 data is reported in State of Hawaii, Office of Elections, General
Election-State of Hawaii-Statewide, November 3, 1998, Summary Report, supra n. 138, at 5.
Vol. 71424
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The solid showing of several 2000-2008 referendums-most notably
in New Hampshire and Rhode Island and to some extent Connecticut-
makes it possible to advance several general conclusions about the condi-
tions and strategies associated with overcoming the obstacles to their pas-
sage. The first challenge facing convention supporters, as we have seen, is
confronting citizen indifference to state constitutional reform, and several
lessons emerge about ways that this has been done and might be done in
future campaigns. The second challenge, as we have also seen, is overcom-
ing the strenuous opposition of in-power parties and groups as well as con-
stitutionally favored groups. Here, as well, several lessons about how this
might be achieved emerge from the recent referendum campaigns.
A. Overcoming Citizen Indifference
If a chief obstacle to passage of mandatory convention referendums is
citizen indifference that is grounded in a lack of knowledge about state
constitutional issues and an inability to make a connection between consti-
tutional reform and issues of governance, then a principal challenge for ref-
erendum supporters is to boost citizen knowledge about, and connection
with, state constitutional issues. This challenge can be met, and was met to
some extent in several 2000-2008 referendums, primarily by ensuring that
the convention referendum has high visibility well before election day. 2 10
A preparatory commission can go a long way toward increasing the
visibility of a convention referendum, 211 as in Rhode Island in 2004. Rhode
Island is the only mandatory convention referendum state whose constitu-
tion requires the legislature to appoint a non-partisan preparatory commis-
sion prior to the referendum. 212 The history of voter behavior in Rhode
Island reveals a close correlation between the work of preparatory commis-
sions and the success rate of ensuing convention referendums. In 1984, the
preparatory commission recommended approval of the referendum, and
voters gave their approval and a convention was called.213 In 1994, the
Legislature was so late in appointing the preparatory commission that it
never even met; that year's referendum obtained the support of only 40.6%
of voters. 2 14 In 2004, the Legislature appointed a commission in a timely
fashion and commission members released a comprehensive report; how-
ever, the commission report made no recommendation on whether voters
210. Infra nn. 211-228.
211. On the importance of a preparatory commission and its influence in New York in 1997, see
Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1027-1029.
212. Benjamin, The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform, supra n. 2 at 193.
213. Anderson, supra n. 102.
214. Id.
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should or should not approve a convention call. 215 Despite the lack of a
recommendation, the commission report received ample news coverage and
had the effect of boosting citizen knowledge about the issues that might be
considered at a convention. 216 It is noteworthy that the Rhode Island con-
vention referendum came within several percentage points of passing in
2004, securing 48% of the vote. 2 17 In short, creation of an official prepara-
tory commission-and even in the absence of a constitutional requirement,
state officials are fully capable of establishing them and have done so in
anticipation of prior referendums 218-can play a key role in drawing citizen
attention and increasing support for such referendums.
Governors and gubernatorial candidates can also play an important
role in boosting the visibility of and dispelling citizen uncertainty about
mandatory convention referendums. Governors have long been understood
to play a critical role in building support for constitutional reforms, whether
such reforms take place through the amendment process or in revision con-
ventions, 2 19 in part because they "are uniquely situated to mobilize people
and resources for state-wide, good government reform efforts." 2 2 0 On con-
stitutional issues in particular, "[g]ubernatorial support is critical . . . be-
cause the governor is the statewide official who is most capable of com-
manding public attention on constitutional issues and persuading an other-
wise indifferent electorate to support reform." 2 2 1 This has the effect of not
only giving voters more familiarity with the convention referendum but also
removing some of their uncertainty about approving what can otherwise
seem-and is often portrayed by critics as-a radical measure.
Endorsements from and active involvement of governors or gubernato-
rial candidates in referendum campaigns contributed to the strong showings
of referendums in New Hampshire in 2002 and Rhode Island in 2004 and
played some role in boosting the 2008 Connecticut referendum to a late
lead in the polls. It is significant that the referendum that came closest to
passing was in New Hampshire in 2002, where both gubernatorial candi-
dates in an open-seat race (Republican Craig Benson and Democrat Mark
Fernald) supported a convention call, albeit for different reasons. 2 2 2 In
Rhode Island in 2004, Republican Governor Carcieri lobbied heavily for the
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. State of Rhode Island, Board of Elections, 2004 General Election, supra n. 109.
218. Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1025.
219. Sturm, supra n. 80 at 61-62; Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions 377
(Oxford U. Press 2009).
220. Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1050.
221. Dinan, supra n. 168, at 519.
222. Fernald, Benson Support Constitutional Convention, supra n. 83.
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referendum, and it came close to passing.2 2 3 And in Connecticut in 2008,
Republican Governor Rell expressed her support for a referendum when
responding to a question at a September press conference. 2 2 4 Admittedly,
gubernatorial support is not a sufficient condition for a strong referendum
showing, given that Hawaii's Republican Governor Lingle endorsed a 2008
referendum that barely secured one-third of voter support. 225 But such sup-
port played a key role in several states.
There are other ways of overcoming citizen indifference besides estab-
lishing an official preparatory commission and securing the active participa-
tion of the governor or gubernatorial candidates, and some of these were
evident in 2000-2008 even if they were not determinative in these particu-
lar instances. A well-organized and well-funded campaign by referendum
supporters can generate voter interest, especially when supporters take the
opportunity to prepare for the referendum vote well in advance of the elec-
tion. 2 2 6 However, none of the supportive campaigns during this period was
able to secure much in the way of financial backing, and some were not
even able to organize a campaign at all. 2 27 Short of a well-organized and
well-funded campaign, there is also the possibility of relying on public fo-
rums sponsored by the League of Women Voters or similar groups. Such
forums were arranged in Illinois in 2008 and generated some media cover-
age, but forums of this sort generally do not attract the interest of citizens
who are not already politically attuned.228 Finally, controversy can occa-
sionally generate media coverage and voter interest, as occurred in the later
stages of the Illinois referendum when a lawsuit and series of state court
decisions regarding misleading referendum ballot language attracted some
223. Anderson, supra n. 102.
224. Dixon, supra n. 121.
225. DePledge, supra n. 139.
226. As Gerald Benjamin has noted, "[T]he predictability of the time of the question's appearance
on the ballot does offer an opportunity to commission studies and hold conferences and take other steps
that can attract voter interest in the years and months leading up to the referendum." Benjamin,
Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1024.
227. Organized supportive campaigns were present in Connecticut in 2008 in the form of the Con-
necticut Constitution Convention Campaign that raised $15,000. Hladky, supra n. 112. Campaigns
were present in Hawaii, in 2008, in the form of It's Time Hawaii. Niesse, Constitutional Redo, supra n.
144. They were present in Illinois, in 2008, in the form of the Illinois Citizens' Coalition. Behrend,
supra n. 154. Meanwhile, although Rhode Island did not feature a single coordinated campaign as was
found in these other states, several groups did spend minor amounts of money in support of the referen-
dum. See Liz Anderson, Election Spending Reports Probed, The Providence J. (R.I.) B I (Nov. 18,
2004) (available at Lexis, News Library, PRVJNL).
228. League to Hold Forum on State Constitution Issue Tonight, Chi. Daily Herald, Neighbor 1 (Oct.
23, 2008) (available at Lexis, News Library, CHDLY).
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coverage. 2 2 9 However, there is no indication that this increased media cov-
erage had any effect on mitigating what turned out to be a sizeable defeat.
B. Overcoming Opposition Groups
Referendum supporters have employed various strategies for overcom-
ing opposition from particular interest groups. It is, of course, important to
have organization, money, favorable media coverage, and high-profile en-
dorsements, among other standard elements in any successful political cam-
paign. However, the lesson to emerge from 2000-2008 is that mandatory
convention referendums have a particular dynamic. The key is to identify
institutional reforms or issues that command popular support but are
blocked in the political process or do not stand a chance of emerging from
the constitutional amendment process. Given that in-power political parties
and their allied groups, as well as constitutionally favored groups, have the
incentive and means to mount substantial opposition to convention referen-
dums, the challenge for supporters is to highlight salient issues that attract
such broad-based public support that it becomes possible to overcome the
opposition of particular interests. Additionally, supporters must be able to
demonstrate that these issues are not only deserving of constitutional reso-
lution but can only be realistically achieved through a convention rather
than the ordinary amendment process. This can involve highlighting vari-
ous ways that existing constitutional provisions limit the ability to govern
the state effectively; it can also involve showing that new provisions would
lead to more effective or responsive governance.
One type of issue that mandatory convention referendum supporters
seized on to some effect in 2000-2008 concerns direct democratic reforms
such as the initiative, referendum, and recall, and occasionally the related
issue of legislative term limits. Direct democracy and term limits have
polled well in previous mandatory referendum convention campaigns.230
And these issues featured particularly prominently in several of the recent
campaigns in support of convention referendums. Such was the case in
Rhode Island in 2004, where supporters touted the opportunity to enact the
statutory initiative and referendum as well as term limits for the speaker of
the state house. 231 Connecticut Governor Rell made the initiative and refer-
endum the centerpiece of her support for a 2008 convention referendum that
229. See Mark Konkol, Judge: Ballot Question 'Misleading and False'; Critics Filed Suit over
Wording of Constitutional Convention Question, Chi. Sun-Times, News 16 (Oct. 2, 2008) (available at
Lexis, News Library, CHISUN).
230. On polling results in the mandatory convention referendum campaign in New York in 1997 see
Benjamin, Mandatory Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1036.
231. On the initiative and referendum, see the comments of Marc Cote, as reported in Anderson,
supra n. 102. On term limits for the house speaker, see Editorial-Vote Yes on Question 2, supra n. 97.
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led in late polling.232 In fact, 65% of respondents to this poll supported
adopting the initiative procedure. 2 3 3 Meanwhile, in campaigning on behalf
of an unsuccessful Hawaii referendum in 2008, state Attorney General Max
Bennett touted the benefits of direct democracy and term limits and argued
that these reforms could best be enacted through a constitutional conven-
tion. 2 34 Similarly, in Illinois in 2008, in supporting a referendum that also
went down to defeat by a large margin, Lieutenant Governor Quinn argued
that a convention was the only viable route to adopting the popular recall,
along with the statutory initiative and referendum (Illinois already has a
constitutional initiative process, but it can only be employed for limited
purposes).2 3 5
The attractiveness of direct democracy and term limits as galvanizing
issues for mandatory convention referendum campaigns stems in part from
their general popularity and in part also from the difficulty of securing their
enactment through the regular constitutional amendment process. A potent
argument deployed by opponents of mandatory convention referendums has
been that there is no need to call a constitutional convention when neces-
sary changes can simply be enacted through the ordinary amendment pro-
cess. 23 6 In this context, the benefit of invoking direct democracy and legis-
lative term limits is that convention supporters can plausibly argue that leg-
islators are unlikely to approve amendments enacting these reforms, save
for highly unusual circumstances, given that these reforms are intended to
limit legislators' powers or electoral prospects. To be sure, mandatory con-
vention referendum states that have a constitutional initiative procedure-
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma and Illinois (whose consti-
tutional initiative is limited in scope)-have another route for adopting leg-
islature-constraining reforms, short of the mandatory convention referen-
dum.2 3 7 However, in the remaining states-Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island-the
mandatory convention referendum is the only viable path to securing these
sorts of institutional reforms. 238
A second issue that mandatory convention referendum supporters re-
lied on to occasional effect in 2000-2008 concerns recent state supreme
court rulings that removed certain policy issues from the political process.
State supreme courts have taken an increasingly active role in recent de-
232. Dixon, supra n. 121.
233. Hladky, supra n. 112.
234. DePledge, supra n. 139.
235. Brown, supra n. 153.
236. See e.g. the argument advanced in Blumenthal, supra n. 120.
237. For a discussion of this point, see Benjamin, The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Ques-
tion Referendum, supra n. 13, at 1021.
238. Id.
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cades in issuing controversial decisions abolishing the death penalty, pro-
viding expansive protection for search-and-seizure rights among other civil
liberties, requiring more school funding and a more equitable distribution of
funds, and legalizing same-sex marriage and civil unions. 2 3 9 On two occa-
sions-in New Hampshire in 2002 and Connecticut in 2008-convention
supporters seized on recent state supreme court rulings on one of these mat-
ters as a warrant for calling a convention for the purpose of overturning the
ruling and returning the issue to the political process.
In New Hampshire in 2002, convention supporters objected to a string
of state Supreme Court decisions, including one issued earlier that year,
requiring the state to make significant changes in funding K-12 schools.240
Convention supporters, including the ultimately victorious Republican gu-
bernatorial candidate, Craig Benson, argued that these rulings improperly
limited legislative discretion on an issue that properly belonged in the legis-
lative domain. These critics of the Court's school funding decisions argued
that a convention would provide a vehicle for counteracting the Court's
decisions and restoring legislative authority over school funding.241 To be
sure, in this case, such a constitutional change could proceed through the
legislature; there was no institutional or interest-based reason why legisla-
tors would be opposed to recommending such an amendment. However,
convention supporters/court critics argued that the legislature had, for
whatever reason, not yet taken action and that convention delegates would
be able to respond to the Court's decisions more effectively. 242 A sign of
the importance of this particular issue to the debate about, and the strong
showing of, the 2002 New Hampshire convention referendum, was the
Union Leader's election-day editorial, which focused entirely on the state
Supreme Court's school-funding decisions as the basis for its endorsement
of the referendum. 243
In Connecticut in 2008, convention supporters focused heavily on and
received a boost from the issuance of a state Supreme Court decision on
October 10, 2008 that legalized same-sex marriage. 244 Prior to this deci-
sion 245- which marked the third time that a state supreme court decision
legalized same-sex marriage, after Massachusetts in 2003 and California in
239. These decisions are discussed in Williams, supra n. 219, at 113-134.
240. The initial decision was Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993). The 2002
decision was Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002).
241. See Fernald, Benson Support Constitutional Convention, supra n. 83; Van Loan, supra n. 89.
242. Van Loan, supra n. 89.
243. Editorial: Yes on Ballot Questions; Rein in Court, Fix Constitution, supra n. 81.
244. Hladky, supra n. 112.
245. Kerrigan v. Commr. of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
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May 2008 246-Supporters of the Connecticut convention referendum prima-
rily touted the opportunity to adopt direct democracy. 247 However, in the
immediate aftermath of the decision, some convention supporters turned in
the final weeks of the campaign to emphasize the possibility that a conven-
tion could overturn the decision by amending the state constitution to pro-
hibit same-sex marriage. 248 Convention supporters argued that the legisla-
ture was not inclined to approve a court-constraining constitutional amend-
ment, leaving the mandatory convention referendum the only possible
avenue toward achieving this goal. 2 4 9 As has been noted, several weeks
after the ruling was handed down, an independent poll showed the referen-
dum with an 11-point lead, although poll respondents were more supportive
of a convention than a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. 2 5 0 The
referendum went down to defeat the next week by nearly a 20-point mar-
gin. 25t
V. CONCLUSION
My concern in this article has been to draw attention to the importance
of the mandatory convention referendum. This device is almost unique to
the American state constitutional tradition and is currently a feature of 14
state constitutions. 252 It is of particular interest in the contemporary era
because it currently offers the most viable mechanism for undertaking a
comprehensive review of the cumulative effect of piecemeal amendments
that may have, over time, produced some inconsistent and unworkable out-
comes.
It is important to be clear about the limits and possibilities of state
constitutional reform that might be achieved through constitutional conven-
tions. It should be emphasized that constitutional conventions, whether
they result from legislative-initiated convention calls or mandatory referen-
246. Goodridge v. Dept of Pub. Health, 789 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
247. Dixon, Group Seeks to Win Right to Petition, Conn. Post Online (Bridgeport, Conn.) (June 26,
2008).
248. Eaton-Robb, Marriage Ruling Not the End of Debate in Conn., supra n. 118.
249. On the day after the state supreme court decision, Peter Wolfgang, executive director of the
Family Institute of Connecticut was quoted as arguing about a convention, "This is our one opportunity
for the people to have a voice, for the people to be heard, for them to decide whether marriage will be
protected as between a man and a woman." Id.
250. Hladky, supra n. 112.
251. Eaton-Robb, Conn. Voters Decide Not to Change Constitution, supra n. 177.
252. The one other constitutional system around the world to make use of a mandatory convention
referendum device is the Constitution of Micronesia, which requires that a convention referendum be
submitted to the people every 10 years. Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, art. XIV,
§ 2. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions 14
(Cambridge U. Press 2009).
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dums, are incapable of resolving many of the problems that are currently
seen as plaguing state governance, and it is important to be clear about this
limited capacity. To the extent that current concerns stem from a mismatch
between federal mandates and state fiscal capacity to carry out these man-
dates, for instance, or the inability of the two major parties to agree on
spending levels and priorities or taxation levels and distribution, state con-
stitutional reform is unlikely to generate solutions. However, insofar as
current concerns about state governance stem from constitutional provisions
that unduly limit state legislative discretion or require certain types and
levels of spending, but then limit the ability to raise revenue to carry out
these requirements, then it is possible that state constitutional reform can
address these problems. 2 5 3
To the extent that the cumulative effect of piecemeal amendments cre-
ates problems of the latter type, whether regarding fiscal policy or other
issues, then conventions can offer a beneficial way of addressing them, and
it becomes important to analyze the political dynamics of the mandatory
convention referendum device that offers the most viable way of calling
such conventions. The referendums held between 2000 and 2008 offer les-
sons about the continuing obstacles to their passage but also point the way
to strategies that might lead to their approval. The chief obstacles are citi-
zen indifference to state constitutional reform and strenuous opposition to
conventions on the part of in-power parties and in-power and constitution-
ally favored groups. Although convention supporters were unable in any of
these instances to surmount these obstacles, several came close to doing so,
primarily by boosting the referendums' visibility as a result of preparatory
commissions or gubernatorial endorsements and by highlighting salient is-
sues that enjoyed broad popular backing but had little chance of emerging
through the ordinary amendment process. Such an analysis might not only
contribute to our knowledge of the distinctive patterns that characterize
mandatory convention referendum campaigns but might also be of use to
individuals seeking to secure approval of such referendums in upcoming
years, including in the four states where they will be considered in 2010 and
another three states in 2012.
253. See Peter Galie, Presentation, Recent Experiences in Other States and Nations (Oct. 14, 2009)
(available at http://igs.berkeley.edulevents/reform2010_files/galie.pdf). This presentation, which was
part of a panel on "Recent Experiences in Other States and Nations," was part of an overall conference
entitled "Getting to Reform: Avenues to Constitutional Change in California." See http://igs.berkeley.
edulevents/reform2010.html (accessed May 9, 2010).
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